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Abstract 
Ongoing concerns have been raised over the effectiveness of 
information technology products and systems in maintaining 
privacy protection for sensitive data. The aim is to ensure that 
sensitive health information can be adequately protected yet 
still be accessible only to those that “need-to-know”. To 
achieve this and ensure sustainability over the longer term, it 
is advocated that an alternative, stable and secure system ar-
chitecture is required. This paper considers the adoption of a 
model targeted at health information that provides much 
higher degrees of protection. A purpose built demonstrator 
that was developed based on enterprise-level systems software 
products is detailed. The long term aim is to provide a viable 
solution by utilizing contemporary, commercially supported 
operating system and allied software. The advantages and 
limitations in its application with a medical database are dis-
cussed. The future needs in terms of research, software devel-
opment and changes in organizational policy for healthcare 
providers, is outlined. 
Keywords: Information Security, Health Information Systems, 
Operating Systems, Access Control 
Introduction 
Advances in storage and communication technologies have 
made large repositories of data available even when they are 
maintained on separate systems and geographically distributed.  
The access to such data sets is often subject to varying degrees 
of legal, social and ethical constraints. Further, the data sets 
may not be available for open scientific research due to the 
sensitive and private nature of the information they contain. 
For example, individual personal health records offer signifi-
cant value for medical and related research but such informa-
tion cannot be readily accessed in a manner suitable for such 
research. The causes include the need to abide by national 
privacy legislation, the reluctance to change to electronic re-
cord format due to security fears and the requirement to main-
tain end-user trust in the overall healthcare information sys-
tem. Even when access rights have been granted - for example 
the data has been sanitized by having all personal identifica-
tion removed - there are still legitimate concerns over the de-
gree of privacy that contemporary IT applications will provide. 
The present reality is that IT applications operate on commod-
ity level computer operating systems that do not - and cannot - 
provide the required level of assurance needed for scientific 
research to be undertaken on sensitive data. They were never 
designed for this purpose. 
Information security mechanisms do exist to ensure sensitive 
information is protected and only accessible on a “need-to-
know” and approval basis. It is imperative that both adversar-
ies, such as external system “hackers” and technical/operations 
personnel with in-house knowledge be denied inappropriate 
access. The security mechanism known as Mandatory Access 
Control (MAC) is described below and can be used, as 
adapted, to enforce the necessary security and privacy proc-
esses required for handling sensitive health data. Such mecha-
nisms have been studied and understood for over 30 years, 
mainly in defence related systems. However, they have not 
been evident in contemporary commodity level operating sys-
tem or allied application level environments. 
In particular, the ICT industry‟s move towards development of 
application systems based around so-called “Service Oriented 
Architectures (SOA)” and “Web Services” software environ-
ments presents new security challenges in the healthcare envi-
ronment. Security standards, even for these high level service 
structures often based around “interpreter” sub-systems such 
as XML, etc. and Internet/World-Wide-Web “browser” pack-
ages, are complex and only in the early stages of development 
and deployment. Moreover, all of these structures critically 
depend upon the overall security and dependability of the un-
derlying “middleware”, operating system and computer hard-
ware systems. An application cannot be any more secure than 
the underlying systems upon which it depends. The same holds 
true for contemporary computer grid technologies, e.g. the 
Globus [1]. In other words, trying to adequately secure the 
shared “virtual machine” environments that grid technologies 
currently exploit is next to impossible (i.e., far too challenging 
for the foreseeable future).  
The primary aim of this project is to build a “Concept Tech-
nology Demonstrator”, based upon advanced cryptographic 
and information research and technologies (e.g., Cryptocards
1
 
and Starlight InfoSec technology
2
) in order to provide ultra-
secure and sanitized access to the protected data sets.  
                                                          
1 “Cryptographic plug-in cards”, Eracom (Safenet) Australia. 
2 “Starlight InfoSec Technology”, Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation (DSTO), Australia. 
The non-Sustainability of Current Approaches 
There is a strong vested business interest by mainstream sup-
pliers of computer operating systems and similar middleware 
products to perpetuate the belief that computer applications 
can be “made secure from within”, irrespective of other soft-
ware or even hardware components. In other words, the cor-
rect use of their technology will ensure a sufficiently secure 
operating environment upon which application programs can 
run safely. Unfortunately, any such assumption is flawed since 
in reality they represent a “fortress built upon sand” [2].  
Current base operating systems in the commercial arena are 
based around what is designated as “Discretionary Access 
Control” or DAC. Essentially this design allows the “owner” 
of any object in a system to, at their discretion (from where the 
term DAC comes) pass on their access rights to any other per-
son or entity in the overall information system‟s environment. 
In particular, DAC really does not acknowledge the essential 
difference between a computer “user”, a person, and the indi-
vidual “processes” in the system that act on his/her behalf. 
Moreover, the DAC structure assumes that the user is com-
pletely familiar with and trusts any program or related soft-
ware system which they cause to execute in the computer. In 
the current environment these assumptions, while possibly 
valid in the era of large mainframe computer systems with 
large “in-house” software development and support organisa-
tions prior to the development of global “packaged” software 
industry, are simply no longer true. The DAC approach, more-
over, assumes that users are the formulators of their own “dis-
cretionary” policy, a situation that is no longer valid as overall 
information systems become subject to overriding legal, socie-
tal and enterprise policy requirements. 
The applications will not be secure unless the underlying oper-
ating system and hardware have been specifically developed 
with security in mind. A system that is built to utilize a Manda-
tory Access Control (MAC) mechanism will provide levels of 
security relating to all aspects of the computing system, i.e., 
“enforce an administrative set policy over all subjects and 
objects in a system, basing decisions on labels containing a 
variety of security-relevant information” [3].   
Practical Implementations of MAC 
There are many implementations of Mandatory Access Con-
trols (MAC) based systems, but one of the most popular is 
called SELinux (Security-Enhanced Linux) [4]. It was de-
signed and engineered by the National Security Agency, an 
intelligence-gathering organization belonging to the govern-
ment of the United States. Released in 2000 as a patch to the 
Linux operating system, SELinux quickly gathered popularity 
within the Linux community due to its structural simplicity and 
the impeccable credentials of its designers. It now exists as an 
open-source module transparently integrated into the Linux OS 
kernel. Optimistically, the casual user may receive security 
support from SELinux without even noticing that the module 
is active, due to generic security configurations created by 
some of the recently arisen SELinux support groups. 
SELinux shares two fundamental properties with many MAC 
systems. Firstly, the super-user concept of DAC systems (i.e. 
“root” or “Administrator”) is banished, so that all users of the 
system are controlled by the same configuration policy. The 
policy is written by a security administrator. If an attacker can 
acquire the privileges of the security administrator, then the 
policy can be changed to suit his or her ends. But unlike the 
super-user, who controls any aspect of the system, the security 
administrator exists only to secure the machine, and not to 
make use of it. 
Secondly, like some other MAC systems, SELinux is based 
upon the concept of “type enforcement”, in which all the ob-
jects in an operating system (be they files, network sockets or 
processes) are labelled and classified as “domains” or “types”. 
The system configuration determines how domains with label 
x are able to access types with label y. Typically the access 
rights will be described, in a broad sense, as “domain x can 
read type y”, “domain x can write to type y”, “domain x can 
execute type y”, combinations of these, or “domain x cannot 
interact with type y in any way”. This last option is the implicit 
default, so only positive relationships between domains and 
types need to be configured.  
Nevertheless, the flexibility provided by SELinux tends to be 
its undoing, at least from the perspective of the casual user. 
Because there are many domains and types within even a sin-
gle-user system, and because each possible positive interaction 
needs to be considered, configuration of access rights is a la-
borious and error-prone process. Add to this the fact that each 
system is guaranteed to be different to the one on which the 
prepackaged configuration was prepared, and a nightmare sce-
nario in which SELinux denies essential accesses - such as 
allowing the system's Graphical User Interface to start - be-
comes a common one [5].  
There are well-known strategies that can help to reduce con-
figuration complexities. One of the most popular of these is 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), which intersperses a 
“role r” into the relationship between domain and type, such 
that, for example, if “role r can read type y” and “if domain x 
is a member of role r”, then “x can read y”. Since there are a 
small number of roles relative to the number of domains and 
types, then the number of rules relating roles to types and do-
mains to roles should be much fewer than the number of rules 
that relate domains directly to types. SELinux supports a 
primitive version of RBAC, yet a typical SELinux configura-
tion file still runs to about 50,000 lines. 
The RedHat company sells RedHat Linux Enterprise and 
sponsors the “Fedora Core” open-source software activity, 
both of which sport an extension of SELinux that includes 
“strict mode” and “targeted mode” structures. Strict mode is 
no different to the “vanilla” version of SELinux, but targeted 
mode protects only a subset of domains and types, usually 
those which have interaction with the external world via net-
work sockets, etc. (that is, those objects which are most likely 
to be attacked by hackers). The remaining objects within the 
system are labelled “unconfined” and can “run amok” with 
only the discretionary access controls regulating their behav-
iour. RedHat ships SELinux in the default mode of “targeted”, 
so that basic protection is afforded to the system without the 
mechanism becoming invasive, in turn preventing the user 
from being productive, and swamping RedHat support with 
basic administrative support requests. The flipside to this is 
that RedHat does not offer support to issues arising from the 
strict mode of SELinux. As will be seen later, this has a sub-
stantial impact on the use of SELinux to protect medical or 
other application data. 
Protecting Medical Application Data 
The primary intention of SELinux is to protect objects embed-
ded within the operating system, with security of application 
data being an afterthought. SELinux in effect partitions the 
operating system space into a set of “sandboxes”, protected 
areas between which communication is tightly regulated. The 
mechanism is generic, and consequently, the security adminis-
trator can create an additional series of sandboxes at the appli-
cation level to protect medical and other kinds of data. For 
example, the administrator may configure a web-browsing 
sandbox that permits a web browser such as Internet Explorer 
or Mozilla Firefox to access the internet. In addition, the ad-
ministrator may also configure a medical-related sandbox in 
which a medical application is permitted to access medical 
records. However, unless explicitly permitted, the web 
browser does not have access to the medical records. Neither 
does the medical application have the same level of exposure 
outside the network as the web browser. The security adminis-
trator can create arbitrary levels of complexity in the applica-
tion layer by constructing sandboxes for different applications, 
yet the enforcement mechanism of SELinux treats them all 
equally and prevents unauthorized accesses. Whereas if a 
hacker attacked a DAC system through the network interface, 
and managed to acquire super-user permissions, in an SELinux 
scenario, the hacker would control only a single sandbox, and 
would need to launch additional exploits, each of which be-
came increasingly infeasible with distance from the network 
interface. 
An important caveat is that the “targeted” mode of Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux and Fedora Core does not permit application-
level sandboxes, because all application process run in the 
unconfined domain. Any system supporting application level 
security is compelled to run in strict mode, which in turn 
means that it is likely not to be fully supported by its commer-
cial vendor. 
Building an SELinux Proxy 
Application data tends to be much more dynamic and flexible 
than operating-system level data. There may be many users of 
an application level database, whereas the number of owners 
of operating system processes tends to be very small. By de-
fault, SELinux is configured for four users, including system, 
staff, sys-admin and ordinary users. Adding new users in-
volves recompiling and reloading the configuration policy, as 
does adding new rules for interactions between domains and 
types. As operating-system level relationships tend to be very 
static, for example, changing only when new software is in-
stalled, this is not especially disadvantageous for the normal 
use cases for SELinux but is not well suited for creating rap-
idly changing sandboxes. 
Our solution to this problem, which also avoids the problem of 
creating additional complex interactions between application 
and operating system level objects, is to create a proxy. The 
proxy runs at the application level and is secured in its own 
sandbox by SELinux, preventing unwanted interactions with 
other processes. The proxy regulates access by application-
level process to protected data, using its own set of configura-
tion files.  In one sense, this solution can be viewed as nested 
SELinux, whereby the proxy represents a micro-instance of 
SELinux that deals only with application data. Operating sys-
tem level processes see only a monolithic object (the proxy) 
representing application processes, meaning that the number of 
configuration rules between the two layers is linear rather than 
multiplicative. 
The proxy deals with the added levels of interaction complex-
ity at the application layer by using an enhanced version of 
RBAC, in which role permissions are inherited throughout a 
hierarchy. By collating roles into hierarchy, and associating 
the lowest member of each hierarchy with each type, this obvi-
ates the need to associate every role with every type. As an 
example, a vertical slice of a role hierarchy may consist of 
“Doctor is a subset of role Clinician” and “Surgeon is a subset 
of role Doctor”. Configuring the policy with “any user in the 
role of Clinician has access to type y” automatically covers the 
rules for “any user in the role of Doctor has access to type y” 
and “any user in the role of Surgeon has access to type y” by 
virtue of their membership of the family. Portions of the hier-
archy can be overridden: configuring “any user in the role of 
Surgeon does not have access to type y” does not cause a con-
tradiction but allows only Clinicians and Doctors access to 
type y. 
An option in this research was to build the extended RBAC 
functionality natively into SELinux for which the source code 
is freely available. However, the benefits to operating-system 
level objects, which are not ordered hierarchically, are 
unlikely to outweigh the disadvantage in branching the 
SELinux source code, consequently reducing the successful 
uptake of this solution. 
The mechanism by which the proxy works is very simple, and 
abstractly mirrors the SELinux mechanism. A client interacts 
with the proxy via a pair of Client and Server messages. For 
each client message received, the proxy sends exactly one 
server message. 
The client authenticates itself to the proxy using a client mes-
sage with type CREDENTIALS and with a payload containing 
the user, role and password that describe the client. Until the 
next such message is received, the proxy caches the creden-
tials. This mimics the SELinux mechanism, which authenti-
cates a user via a password before transitioning the user into 
the requested role. The proxy generally responds to credential 
messages by sending a dummy OK response. 
The credentials are evaluated whenever the client requests 
access, either a read or a write, to a record in the proxy data-
base. The proxy passes the credentials, along with the record 
identifier and the policy to the security filter. The security fil-
ter assesses the credentials, decides whether the record can be 
accessed in the way intended and passes this decision to the 
proxy. In the case of a read request, the proxy relays the ap-
propriate record back to the client. If the client has requested a 
write, then the material passed in the payload of the 
REQUEST_WRITE_FILE message is appended or overwrit-
ten to the record. 
 
Figure 1 - Architecture of the SELinux Proxy 
Whereas SELinux can protect data to the granularity of the 
file, the proxy has arbitrary granularity, as determined by tags 
exchanged between the proxy and its client. The client may 
wish to retrieve a single word from a database, or an entire 
collection of files. Our mechanism allows this with as little as 
a single configuration, although for more complex cases, the 
number of configuration rules will increase linearly in the 
number of database items. 
There are some cases when records must be accessible even in 
the absence of legitimate credentials. For example, if the au-
thorized viewer of a patient‟s case file is not present, but the 
patient requires emergency treatment, then the availability of 
the information is more important than its privacy. So the 
proxy is programmed to respond to a special role of “Emer-
gency”, in which case it moves into auditing mode, until a new 
set of credentials with a differing role is provided. In auditing 
mode, all records can be retrieved and modified, but each ac-
tion is recorded and flagged for review by the security admin-
istrator. Appropriate punishment for abusing this mode can be 
metered out at a social level.  Our prototype does not handle 
differential records, whereby the deltas between subsequent 
versions of records are stored, although this would be advan-
tageous for malicious or accidental modification of records in 
auditing mode. 
It is not essential for the proxy and the client to maintain an 
encrypted channel, since access control on the channel can be 
maintained by SELinux. For ease of configuration, all commu-
nication can be encrypted using commonly available algo-
rithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard. Our re-
search did not consider key management issues between the 
client and the proxy, although the usual public key establish-
ment protocols, such as Diffie-Hellman can be used.  
To prove the effectiveness of the proxy, we developed a sim-
ple prototype of the proxy and a client, as shown in Figure 2. 
Auditing data for the client is shown in Figure 3. We used the 
proxy and client to demonstrate the security advantages of 
SELinux over DAC-based systems such as Windows XP.  In 
DAC-based systems, it was relatively easy to use hacking tools 
such as rainbow tables [6] to break weak Windows system 
administrator passwords, and modify the proxy and client code 
to allow unauthorized and unaudited accesses.  As the proxy 
was housed in its own sandbox under SELinux, traditional 
hacking tools did not provide an avenue for breaking into or 
changing the proxy.  The issue remains that this security is 
present only in the unsupported “strict” mode of SELinux 
which is still too complex to deploy in commercial situations.  
Although the proxy significantly simplifies configuration of 
application data, it does not address problems at the operating-
system level that need to be resolved.  Further research in this 
area needs to focus on simplifying generic SELinux configura-
tion, to allow realistic deployment of “strict” SELinux, which 
supports protection of application data. This is indeed happen-
ing, as witnessed by the development of modular policy logic 
in Fedora Core 5, which allows the configuration to be devel-
oped and loaded in blocks relating to the processes or dae-
mons being protected. The efficacy of this strategy has yet to 
be solidly determined. 
 
Figure 2 – The Proxy Client 
 
Figure 3 – Auditing data for the Proxy Client 
Conclusions 
Sufficient evidence is emerging that the security requirements 
and obligations for the protection of sensitive health data can-
not be sustained using contemporary data access control and 
protection mechanisms in current commercial, commodity 
computer systems. “Mandatory Access Control” or MAC, 
incorporated into basic operating systems and allied support-
ing software structures, provides an alternative, strict, security 
policy driven approach far superior to industry standard DAC 
mechanisms. MAC can strengthen protection from unauthor-
ised access to sensitive health related information from both 
outside and inside an organization. This provides enhanced 
privacy protection from staff, including knowledgeable ICT 
professional staff members, gaining access to such sensitive 
data for which they are not authorised (i.e. view, modify, copy, 
transmit, delete, etc.). It further provides enhanced „boundary‟ 
security from outside intrusion whereby adversaries, such as 
hackers and spyware operatives, are unable to gain full control 
of an information system. In the MAC case it can be demon-
strated that damage can be limited to violation of an individual 
user‟s account [7].  
This research has found that a MAC based medical data sys-
tems, although viable, still presents some key research and 
practical deployment challenges. In particular, the “strict” op-
erational mode offered by SELinux may be seen as being too 
rigid for deploying Role-Base Access Control or RBAC struc-
tures with the required levels of flexibility needed in practical 
healthcare situations. Without this flexibility, system recon-
figuration may be required each time a user is added or re-
moved. This is infeasible in practice and is already the subject 
of a number of active research projects. It was shown with the 
demonstrator described in this paper that a compromise can be 
derived that provides an application level proxy to facilitate a 
secure, role-based access interface. A balance has to be struck 
between strict access control security and the degree of flexi-
bility for dynamic modification of any system in the “real 
world”. Any approach taken should be determined from a pri-
vacy impact oriented risk assessment process. For example, 
such an assessment might readily determine a need for emer-
gency over-ride capability to enable at least wide read-only 
access to medical/health data. Such a facility would, however, 
have to be subject to new audit and control requirements as 
well as to limitations potentially related to time periods and the 
location of users. In this regard an implementation that can 
support dynamic reconfiguration in a manageable and under-
standable manner may be essential. Earlier MAC systems were 
simply not designed for this environment where the security 
policy may need to be dynamic, not just in detail but also in 
structure.   
Future needs in terms of research also involve a better under-
standing of the complimentarity of SELinux‟s concept of “type 
enforcement” versus more traditional security structures based 
around hierarchical “Multi-level Secure” or MLS schemes. In 
the health information area it needs to be determined whether 
or not such hierarchical security schemes have a place or not 
and, if so, to what level are modifications of the basic concepts 
involved necessary. Likewise, the concept of “compartmen-
talization”, reflected in the SELinux type enforcement system, 
needs to be assessed in relation to its suitability for all levels 
of information services needed in a nationwide health informa-
tion structure. At the same time, application software devel-
opment needs to become aware of the new parameters af-
forded by the MAC facilities and determine to what level such 
applications may or may not make use of the security mecha-
nisms and services offered, i.e. to determine the distinction 
between what may be labelled as “security aware” versus “se-
curity ignorant” applications. Moreover, the integration of 
existing software systems into this environment must be under-
stood requiring further research into appropriate techniques for 
system integration in higher security environments. In turn, 
this places new demands on education and training as ICT 
professionals need to develop the skills needed to understand, 
utilise and manage this new environment. This indicates that 
necessary or desirable changes in organizational policy and 
management structures for healthcare providers may be also 
needed and, at present, full guidance to policy makers and 
operational management in relation to deployment of newer 
MAC based overall information systems do not appear to ex-
ist. This leads to the need for further research and experimen-
tal system development in the area to enable study of the eco-
nomic, cultural, social and legal responses required. 
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